There is no doubt that the world is becoming a more dangerous place. Supply chains are under strain. Our dependency on resources and imports is facing exposure and risk that we have not seen since the Second World War. China on the rise. Russia in an aggressive expansionist war footing. The United States withdrawing. Conflicts all around the world. The Climate crisis. The migration crisis. All these risks threaten Britain’s security and supply, which depends on what it can obtain, produce, repair and replace. Armed forces need ammunition and components. Hospitals need medicines and equipment. Electricity networks need transformers, cables and skilled engineers. When supplies fail, the consequences reach every household, business and community. The government should therefore create a modern Ministry of Supply. It would be a department charged with coordinating the resources and industrial capacity essential to national resilience and yes, our defence.
The risks are already recognised by the government and by British industry. Britain has a Critical Imports and Supply Chains Strategy covering goods including medicines, minerals and semiconductors. The National Risk Register assesses serious threats to the country. The government’s energy cybersecurity strategy also addresses vulnerabilities involving suppliers and supply chains. These initiatives provide useful foundations, but the question is whether responsibility is sufficiently clear when several departments depend on the same constrained resources. Given the threats, is it not now time to centralise this decision making, oversight and responsibility for supply into one key cabinet level department, a Minister for Supply.
A Ministry of Supply would give that question an institutional answer. The Business Secretary is performing part of that task with energy and rigour. But a full-time post would have as one of its tasks to identify dangerous dependencies, agree priorities across government and commission practical action before disruption becomes an emergency. It would bring together ministers, manufacturers, finance and the public sector, workers, infrastructure operators and scientific expertise around a simple objective: keeping essential national capabilities functioning under pressure and in the event of a national emergency, or under severe strain and restrictions due to other unforeseen events, including climate related incidents.
There is a sound historical precedent. In 1939, Parliament debated creating a Ministry of Supply, including the problem of competing departmental demands. The circumstances today are different, but the underlying coordination challenge remains relevant. Defence, healthcare, critical infrastructure, and energy cannot each assume that the necessary materials, production lines and technical skills will be available whenever they place an order. Covid was one of the most recent examples that faced our country where at a time of national crisis, the state struggled to respond. The right will decry the move as the worst of state socialist planning, but sensible minds and voices will see it for what it is, a government planning for every eventuality with the safety and security of the British people front and centre.
The department’s first responsibility should be a national assessment of critical supply chains and dependencies. It should establish where essential goods originate, which firms provide indispensable components and how quickly alternative supplies could become available. The assessment must reach beyond headline suppliers. A major British factory may still depend on a single overseas producer of a small component whose absence could stop production. An assessment must look further than supply chains just from Europe, it must be an all-encompassing review of our weaknesses and strengths in a global perspective.
This information should support regular exercises. What happens if a major port is disrupted, a supplier suffers a cyberattack or access to a critical material is interrupted? We know that Russia is probing us especially as the strongest supporter in Europe of Ukraine, for weaknesses and vulnerabilities. Departments should test how they would respond together. Businesses should help design the exercises, with commercially sensitive information protected. Parliament should receive an annual account of preparedness, while security-sensitive details should clearly remain confidential. But the work needs to be done.
Second, the ministry should develop selective stockpiles and reserve capacity. The supply and distribution of food is also an essential element requiring work. Some medicines, industrial inputs and replacement parts may justify reserves. Other products are expensive to store, deteriorate quickly or become obsolete. In those cases, contracts for emergency production, maintenance and alternative sourcing may provide better protection. Every proposal should explain its cost, the disruption it addresses and how readiness will be maintained.
Third, public procurement should help sustain capabilities the country genuinely needs. Long-term demand can give manufacturers confidence to invest in new plants and machinery, apprenticeships and additional production. Contracts should reward reliability, repairability and the ability to increase output during emergencies. Smaller suppliers need accessible tenders and prompt payment, allowing resilience to extend throughout the supply chain rather than stopping at the largest contractor. A recent example of this in practice was the government’s decision to allocate defence contracts only to British ports and yards for new warships. There is no reason this model could not be extended to other critical areas of the economy.
Domestic production deserves particular attention where rebuilding lost capability would take years. However, resilience also requires dependable international relationships. Britain should diversify suppliers, cooperate with allies and secure reciprocal arrangements for emergencies. We have a vast Commonwealth through which we have historic ties that is a great pool of resource. We have the best trading relationship with the EU of any third nation and many other great alliances. The government’s critical-imports strategy already recognises the importance of reliable supply chains. A Ministry of Supply, created by this Labour government should turn that principle into coordinated investment and purchasing decisions.
Fourth, workforce planning must sit alongside materials planning. Production cannot expand without technicians, engineers, drivers, maintenance workers, scientists and experienced managers. The ministry should identify essential skills shortages and agree training programmes with employers, colleges and trade unions. Apprenticeships should follow credible demand. Workers’ knowledge of equipment, production bottlenecks and maintenance requirements should inform preparedness from the beginning. This is not the state determining where people will be employed, but a state takin responsible action to ensure we have the skilled workforce required for a resilient and growing economy.
The proposal also requires financial discipline. Creating a department has costs and can generate disruptive reorganisations. Its establishment should therefore consolidate relevant functions where practical, with explicit responsibilities agreed with existing departments and devolved governments, especially working closely with the Trade department. It should have authority to resolve competing priorities, rather than becoming another advisory body. Emergency powers should be narrowly defined, subject to oversight and accompanied by clear expiry arrangements. This will enable the government to respond in a streamlined manner to emergencies and threats quickly without delay.
Success would be measured through practical results: fewer critical dependencies, tested contingency plans, stronger supplier networks and shorter recovery times after disruption. These changes will not happen immediately; the work will take time. But it is important that the work takes place now, so we are prepared for the risks facing us. The ministry should publish those measures and acknowledge where progress falls short. Resilience spending must face scrutiny, but assessments should also recognise the economic and human costs of being unprepared, especially in this ever more dangerous world.
A modern Ministry of Supply would make national preparedness a continuing responsibility. It would connect security with productive capacity, public services with dependable procurement, and industrial investment with skilled employment. The government should create the Ministry and begin with a published review of existing functions and a clear implementation plan. Britain needs the ability to withstand shocks, sustain essential services and recover quickly. Coordinating the means to do so deserves a permanent place at the centre of government. Other European countries are starting to alert their citizens to changes they may need to make or to adapt to in the years ahead. We are constantly being warned that the threats to the UK are growing, and now the government should show its citizens and the world that we are preparing for every eventuality. Labour must lead the way.
